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I. INTRODUCTION
"If a man or Svoman' be gracious and courteous to strangers, it shows
he is a citizen of the world."
-Sir Francis Bacon
In his statement on U.S. Arms Transfer of 19 May 1977, President Carter stated, "hence-
forth arms transfers would be viewed as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used
only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that transfers contribute to our national
security interest." In addition, he stated that the United States, "will continue to utilize arms
transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends." The President has
continued to advocate a policy of restraint as well as the pursuit of broad initiatives designed to
engage the Soviet Union affirmatively for control and influence in the world.
The President's policy statements came at a time when the United States was experiencing
a tremendous increase in Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Although the Foreign Military Sales
program has been in existence for over twenty-five years, it is estimated that approximately
half the business has been concentrated in the past five years.
Since the inception of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in 1949 through the
period up to 1961, the United States Government (USG) has provided $29.9 billion to friendly
Foreign Governments (FG) through the Grant Aid Military Assistance Program (MAP) and sold
$2.5 billion in material and services. During the 1961-1968 timeframe, sales to the nations of
Western Europe were increased, with the result that while MAP, excluding Military Assistance
Service Funds (MASF) to Southeast Asia, declined from $1.6 billion in 1962 to $500 million in
1968, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) increased from an average of $1.5 billion to $2 billion over
the same period. From 1972 to 1974-75 there was a sharp increase in the magnitude of the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and a change in the recepient countries to include the
Middle Eastern nations. This was stimulated by increased revenues to those countries from the
sale of crude oil.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) increased to approximately $13 billion during 1974. Although
Congress, in passing the international Security Assistance Act of 1976, considered a ceiling of
$9 billion for FY76, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for the foreseeable future are expected to

decline to approximately $6 to $7 billion. The major arm sales will probably shift from the
Middle East countries to the NATO allies. The General Dynamics Corporation F-16 aircraft sale
to a European Consortium of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, with co-
production under license arrangements, is an example of this trend.
With the growth and expansion of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) there is a need for manage-
ment procedures and methods that are adequate or mature enough to accommodate the growth
and character of Foreign Military Sales. This thesis is concerned with the management of
Foreign Military Sales cases at the field activity level. Increased demands and expectations are
expressed by the Foreign Government (FG) when the assistance is on a cash basis rather than
under a grant assistance (give away) plan. Because of a cash sale type involvement by the foreign
government, the entire management effort becomes more complex and politically sensitive.
Adding to the complex management effort is the potential for creating adverse international
relations. If problems, which occur, are not satisfactorily resolved; the impact of a dissatisfied
foreign customer can be far greater in magnitude than that of a dissatisfied domestic customer.
In conducting the Foreign Military Sales programs, it behooves all personnel concerned
to insure that proper management is employed.
A. OBJECTIVES
U.S. Navy field activities conduct FMS business at varying degrees of involvement in
each case and in the number of cases. Each FMS case represents a single contractual agreement
between the United States and the foreign government. Hence, each case requires management
effort tailored to the peculiarities of the case.
U.S. Navy field activities, in order to properly and effectively excute their participation
in a given case, must develop an effective managerial strategy and implementation scheme to
accommodate the current and future FMS business.
This work attempts to aid the field activities in this endeavor by clarifying or answering the
following questions.
1. What is the nature and scope of FMS business?
2. What are the criteria for determining effective FMS Management?

3. What are the major problems associated with FMS that affect its management?
4. What are some of the possible alternatives available to improve existing
management?
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH
Certain limitations delineate the bounds of extrapolation applicable to the research.
Foreign policy considerations are recognized as being important and sometimes crucial factors
with respect to the initiation, negotiation, and consummation of FMS. The foreign policy con-
siderations are viewed as external influences on the management efforts of field activities;
therefore, they were not subjected to criticisms within the scope of this research.
The primary thrust is directed at two field activities, characterized by Navy Industrial
Fund (NIF) type missions. Their major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) efforts involve sale of
minor weapon systems, overhauls, and some manufacture and production of ordnance altera-
tions. Combined Foreign Military Sales (FMS) operations generate in excess of $50 million each
year and continue to grow. It should be noted that sales of aircraft and associated equipment,
as well as ship construction, account for more than half of the total dollar volume of Foreign
Military Sales (FMS).
The research was limited to those cases that were characterized by cash sales in response to
Foreign Governments (FG) request. Supply Support arrangements wherein the Foreign Govern-
ment (FG) "invests" in the USG logistic system or Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts for
training were not specifically reviewed.
C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The basic conceptual frame work for the research was provided by a set of assumptions
resulting from conclusions drawn from the literature and the author's view of the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program.
The set of assumptions served to delimit as well as to provide guidance through the en-
vironment of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) organization. The assumptions are as follows:
1. The current organizational and policy structure of the Defense Security Assis-
tance Agency had evolved to a stage where it supported and operated an effective and efficient
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. It is given that the foreign policy of the United States

3. Machinery and materials to assist European countries in producing their own
military items without interfering with the economic recovery
.
Even though FMS was authorized as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
the volume of sales was minuscule in view of the financial disasters caused by the war efforts.
Countries were simply not in a position to purchase. The U.S. had emerged from the war as an
acknowledged world leader, with an economic base moving towards a committement to the prin-
ciple of collective security. However, as the countries of Europe began to recover financially
from the war, lesser developed countries sought assistance, and with the growing deterioration
of the U.S. international balance of payments, the concept of Foreign Military Sales as a feasible
alternative would surface at the end of the 1950's.
The Kennedy Administration provided a new focus on the foreign assistance program.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 consolidated economic aid and military assistance and sales
under a single law. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 reaffirmed the necessity for foreign
assistance as an important instrument of U.S. national policy and reaffirmed U.S. support for
NATO.
Tantamount to the new emphasis, is a memo from the Secretary of Defense to the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in early 1962. In this memo
McNamara stated, "I should like to encourage sales of military equipment appropriate to the
needs of foreign nations in every possible way." McNamara went on to stress the following
objectives in making the sales:
1. Promote the defensive strength of our allies, consistent with our political-
economic objectives;
2. Promote the concept of cooperative logistics and standardization with our allies;
3. Offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from essential U.S. military
deployment abroad. (McHesney, 1976.).
Under the leadership of Henry J. Kuss of the International Logistics office, the Pentagon
soon pushed foreign military sales to a pre-eminent position over grant aid. Aggressive salesman-
ship, use of the credit sale revolving fund established in 1958, and a Department of Defense
8

had in the past been dominated by the "give away" aid programs. Such organizations would
have an emphasis markedly different from a program with cost considerations.
2. The goals and objectives of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program were clear
and concise with measurable criteria to monitor and control progress. Unlike most governmental
programs that lack adequate measures of success or failure, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) can
be evaluated based upon cost, quality and schedule.
3. Given that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) occurs in a public sector political
environment, a mechanism of management would serve to buffer the basic economic issues of
providing a product to the customer (who happens to be an international). If, in fact, the spirit
of the free enterprise system is an inherent attribute of the American way of life, it should be
manifested in a business-like relationship that would be a part of the contractual relationship,
forming the basis for the letter of offer and acceptance.
4. Given that political winds have a tendency to change direction depending on
the views that dominate foreign policy, a mechanism of management should exist that wouid
serve to preserve the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program through a media of advocacy. It
would seem both logical and appropriate that such a mechanism exist if Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) is to benefit from the advantages of the free enterprise system.
5. The officers and enlisted personnel would find a positive climate of unlimited
opportunities for achievement. That is to say, participation in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program is career enhancing. The degree to which a program enhances careers determines to a
significant extent the type and caliber of officer that "elects" to join and contribute.
D. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATION
The initial investigation consisted of a visit to the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville,
Kentucky, to review the management effort in progress and to assess the nature of the organiza-
tion and the problems confronting the management of Foreign Military Sales. A review of the
literature, directives, and instructions was conducted to provide a historical perspective of the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. This provided a framework within which the managerial
problems could be assessed and insight into possible alternatives gained.

Subsequent investigations included a trip to the Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering
Station, Port Hueneme, California. The visit was to review the management in force and to gain
insight into an alternative method of operation of essentially the same type of business and
activity level. Interviews were conducted with personnel intimately involved in Foreign Military
Sales (FMS).
The scope of operations investigated was restricted to the U.S. Navy environment, as this
is the service department with which the author has most knowledge. A final visit was made to
Washington, D. C, to the offices of Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy for Security Assistance
(OP63), Chief of Naval Material (MAT-08F), Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA-04G, SEA-0184,
SEA-654, SEA-653) and Naval Supply Systems Command (SUP-033). A series of interviews
was held with personnel knowledgable in the FMS process. The interviews were non-structured
in order to allow free and open discussions, thereby allowing the interviewer the most latitude
in gaining information and providing an atmosphere most conducive for the interviewee to
contribute.
The documentation examined was found to be repetitious in detail and direction. There
were a number of exceptions, notably the DOD 5105. 38-M: Military Assistance and Sales
Manual, under the cognizance of Defense Security Assistance Agency. The historical perspective
is relied upon quite heavily here, since there seems to be a general lack of objectives around
which a managerial strategy can be developed. The bulk of the text will present primarily the
views of the author gathered through the interviews and the literature. References and credit
will be provided as appropriate, codified in the reference section at the end of the thesis.
E. CONSTRUCTION OF THE THESIS
The text has been organized to provide a logical flow from a historical perspective, inclu-
sive of philosphy and an understanding of the Foreign Military Sales process, beginning in
Chapter II. Chapter III will provide an understanding of the roles played by the principals in
determining and "directing" the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Chapter IV will review
the financial management and control systems and their impact on The Foreign Military Sales
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program. Chapter V will discuss the field activities' perception of the Foreign Military Sales
process and the problems involved in such activities' execution of taskings provided by the
implementing command. Chapter VI will attempt to analyze some of the problems, draw con-
clusions, and make recommendation regarding the basic research question as stated.
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II. HISTORY OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN THE UNITED STATES
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the history of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program in order to acquire a historical perspective. In tracing the FMS evolutionary process,
an attempt will be made to respond to the research question : What is the nature and scope of
the FMS business?
The genesis of FMS in the Navy was a small portion of The Military Assistance Program.
Military assistance or foreign aid in the form of war implements has been a part of American
history ever since the days of the American Revolution. It was first witnessed when France
provided a $6.2 million loan to assist the thirteen colonies in the defeat of Cornwallis at the
Battle of Yorktown. The question as to whether to restrict war products to the home shores or
to "assist" other emerging nations of the world occupied the thoughts of the young nation in
1793. President Washington said, "no attempt should be made to obstruct the export of arms
to any war ignited by the French Revolution." Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson advised
the British Minister to the U.S. that, "our citizens have always been free to make, vend and
export arms." (Blumenfeld, 1970)
There was little question, therefore, as to whether or not military assistance to other
nations during war or otherwise would be given by this country. What appears to be a more
pertinent issue is the evolution of the rationale purported to justify to the people (and in fact
to the government itself) why military assistance and subsequently military assistance via the
FMS program should be provided.
The years following the Revolutionary War found the new country more concerned about
local issues, growth and development. The policy of the early days essentually remained in-
tact until 1898, when Congress authorized to the president powers to impose arms embargoes
during the Spanish-American War. It was not until World War I that the U.S. began active
involvement in providing aid on a massive scale, as much as $10.2 billion in the form of loans
and equipment (Vincent, 1975). Much of the assistance flowed through private channels.
However, large scale abuses uncovered through investigations by the Senate Munitions Investi-
gation Committee resulted in a series of neutrality laws being passed, during the period 1934-36.
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In addition arms makers and vendors were required to register and obtain licenses from the
government.
In the same period, the U.S. was concerned with the internal problems created by the
Great Depression, the deterioration of the economic and political situation throughout the
world made it difficult for the U.S. to retain an isolationist policy. The economic realities of
survival caused an apparent effort on the part of the U.S. to contribute to the demise of the
depression. The first step was the Reciprocal Trade Relationship with non-aggressive powers and
the creation of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, D.C. The bank was established to
encourage international trade by providing loans to foreign governments. The bank would
become critical in providing loans in the FMS business in the early 1960 's. The second step in an
effort to stabilize the economic situation was the Tripartate Declaration between the U.S.,
Great Britian and France in 1936. It is significant to note in both instances the commonality
with FMS of today and these agreements, that is, the national interest of the time is served. The
use of military aid through the ages has been instrumental in enhancing the enlightened self-
interest of a nation (Hovey, 1965).
With the passage of the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, the U.S. reinforced its
stance as a neutral nation. Investigations by the Senate Munitions Investigation Committee had
uncovered large scale abuses in private industries peddling arms on the world market for pro-
fitable gains. The U.S. placed an embargo on the export of arms to countries already at war.
Thus the U.S. was prohibited from transporting arms to unfriendly governments. However,
further concern over the war and a need to stimulate the economy caused the repeal of the arms
embargo portions of the previous Neutrality Acts in the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1939.
This latter act allowed for the manufacture and sale of U.S. goods to those countries who were
financially capable of purchasing them. This act essentially allowed the U.S. to provide war
materials to the Allies without committing direct U.S. support.
Under the conditions of the Lend Lease Act of 1941, the U.S. defense industries were en-
couraged to expand. Economically motivated, the U.S. government moved closer to inevitable
involvement in World War II. Defense articles were provided to Great Britian, France and Russia
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without specific terms and conditions for repayment. This was a form of military assistance,
but not Foreign Military Sales as referred to in today's terminology. The magnitude of the pro-
gram was growing rapidly, culminating in more than $48.5 billion in aid to forty-two countries.
At the end of World War II Congress intervened, causing a phasing out of the Lend Lease Act on
a bilateral basis with all countries involved.
The threat of communism in Greece, and the real possibility of the Russians forcibly seizing
the Dardenelles, combined with the fact that a weary British government could not provide any
further assistance, prompted the issuance of the Truman Doctrine and the passage of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947. Of note is the historical importance of this doctrine, as it still
guides much of the assistance and sales programs today. President Truman in his address to
Congress stated:
"I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to sup-
port "free people" (author's accents) who are resisting attempted subjuga-
tion by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The free peoples of the
world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in
our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall
surely endanger the welfare of our own nation." (H.A. Hovey, 1965)
The passage of the act is recognized as the basis for the Foreign Military Assistance Program, the
parent of the Foreign Military Sales program.
With the inception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the passage of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Aid of 1949 authorized grant military aid for countries considered vital to
the national security. In addition, and again of note, was the permission of sales of equipment
to other friendly governments. Three types of military aid were to be supplied on a non-reim-
bursable basis:
1. Direct transfer of U.S. military equipment. The war was over. Demobilization
was in effect, thus, the need for the equipment appeared to have passed.
2. Expert technical assistance and training in the production and use of military
equipment. The war effort had stimulated a tremendous research, development and production
effort in the U.S. There were a number of employment opportunities available; in
addition the countries would have to be trained on the equipment since "NATO : Standardization,
Rationalization and Interoperability" was not a concept in active use immediately after the war.
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arrangement with the Export-Import Bank that extended credit to countries not identified to
the Bank culminated in congressional outcries for reform in the mid-1960 's (Harkavy, 1975). A
1967 staff report published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cited lack of informa-
tion, weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination, and a failure to reconcile arms control
policies with arms sales programs, resulting in a call for increased legislative oversight (Congre-
ssional Staff Study, 1967).
In what was to become the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968 passed as a direct result of congressional dissatisfaction with operating techniques
of FMS under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This new act clarified the goals, authoriza-
tions, restraints and controls governing the administration of FMS. A reorganization occurred in
the Department of Defense, whereby the former International logistics Negotiation Office
(Foreign Military Sales) and the Directorate of Military Assistance (Grant Aid) were combined
in a new office under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and
Sales (Kaine and Wilhite, 1969).
The Act further separated sales from other types of foreign military assistance. It provided
for the sale of U.S. produced military equipment and services on a reimbursable basis to friendly
foreign governments and international organizations. In passing the FMS Act of 1968, the
Congress established the following sales policy (Materna, 1976):
1. Declared the ultimate goal of the U.S. to be a world free from the dangers and
burdens of armaments.
2. Affirmed the increasing cost and complexity of defense equipment and recog-
nized that there continues to be a need for international defense cooperation to maintain peace
and security.
3. Established that the U.S. will facilitate the common defense by entering into
international arrangements with "friendly" (author added quotation marks) countries on
projects involving cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procure-
ment, and logistics support to achieve national defense requirements and objectives of mutual
concern.
4. Authorized sales to "friendly" countries to equip their forces with due regard
to impact on social and economic development and on arms races.
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5. Declared that all such sales be approved only when they are consistent with the
foreign policy interest of the United States.
Some Congressmen had become impatient with the nature and extent of U.S. involvement
overseas (Vietnam) and were concerned that the activity of supplying arms or military equip-
ment might lead to further involvement. They felt that our arms sales, unless controlled pro-
perly, might encourage a furtherance of the arms race in certain areas of the world. To insure
that the basic policy of the FMS Act was executed as intended, Congress also included guide-
lines and specific restraints to govern the administration of U.S. FMS.
Additional changes were made to the Security Assistance Program during the Nixon Ad-
ministration. Particularly noteworthy was, the enumeration of the Nixon Doctrine, through
which, U.S. allies were called upon to share a larger burden of common defense. The findings of
the President's Task Force on International Development in 1970 resulted in the organization for
security assistance in both the State and Defense Departments. Some organizational consolida-
tions were made, such as the establishment of the Defense Security Assistance Agency to
administer both grant aid and sales programs, and it was clearly stated that the objective was to
substitute FMS as rapidly as possible in support of the Nixon Doctrine (Stanley, 1970).
Congressional scrutiny of foreign assistance continued through the early 1970's. Protracted
debates in both Houses precluded passage of a military assistance authorization bill for FY1973,
and a series of continuing resolutions was required to extend the funding of previously authorized
programs (Congressional Digest, 1973). In the authorizing legislation for FY1974, Congress
advised the Executive Branch to return arms transfers to commercial sales channels and to re-
duce FMS to the maximum extent (Foreign Assistance Act, 1973). The following year, the
administration was directed to submit each pending foreign military sale exceeding $25 million
to Congress for approval in advance of consummation (The Foreign Assistance Act, 1974). Con-
gress could then veto these sales if both Houses voted to do so within twenty days (later in-
creased to 30 days). The threat of such a veto has been used twice. One example, occuring during
the Ford Administration, was the proposed sale of 14 battalions of mobile Raytheon Hawk anti-
aircraft missiles to Jordan. Congress feared that mobile battalions might be used for offensive




Congress further expanded its control over the FMS program in 1976. It initially passed
legislation that would have placed an annual $9 billion ceiling on all U.S. arms sales abroad,
both commercial and government-to-govemment combined. President Ford vetoed this definite
ceiling, but final legislation (PL 94-329) did contain an expression of the "sense of congress"
that foreign military sales should not exceed "present levels." The compromised legislation
signed by President Ford contained, among other limitations, the following on U.S. Arms
transfers:
1. The title amended from "The Foreign Military Sale Act" to "International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976." (Section: Title)
2. Export licenses for all military sales over $25 million must be made under the
FMS program (except for Sales to NATO countries) (Section 211)
3. An extension of congressional veto power over proposed FMS sales to cover all
orders over $7 million for major weapons systems, and over $25 million for any other defense
articles or sources. The veto must be voted within 30 calendar days. (Section 211)
4. The DOD has in the past stationed Military Assistance Advisory Groups
(MAAGS) in various countries around the world to provide advice and assistance to local govern-
ments in the purchasing and operation of American arms. Congress ruled that these MAAGS
must be phased out by 30 September 1977, unless specific Congressional authorization has been
voted in a country by country basis. (Section 104)
The congressional interest in FMS heretofore had been characterized by a laissez faire
philosophy. The FMS program evolved out of a tradition of providing assistance to friendly
countries initially struggling for revolutionary independence. Subsequent contributions were
viewed as providing stability in the world and security to the U.S. Post World War II emphasis
focused upon the economic benefits of arms trade. With the end of the Vietnam Conflict and a
growing fear of world instability, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, a new emphasis
emerged. The focus was on arms control; indeed, disarmament pacts have been pursued by the
two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There is, however, a clear and precise philo-
sophy, that FMS will remain a very powerful and influential tool of foreign policy, regardless
of what course the Congress or the president pursues in the future. There does appear to be a
source of conflict, as to how that role will be defined and who (either Congress or the President)
will exercise the tool.
During the 1976 Presidential election campaign, President Carter was strongly critical of
past U.S. arms transfer policies and promised, if elected, to take Executive action to revise the
17

U.S. roles in these areas. On 19 May 1977; President Carter issued a new Executive policy on
the U.S. role in the international transfer of arms. The strongly worded preface reiterates his
desire for a reduction in the current U.S. role.
"Because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiralling arms
traffic, and because of the special responsibility we bear as the largest
arms seller, I believe that the United States must take steps to restrain
its arms transfers."
President Carter's stance, in sharp contrast to those of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, was
the first initiative of its kind coming from the Executive Branch. It was specifically directed at
substantially reducing the U.S. role in international arms transfers.
There were several specific exemptions, notably NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
Israel, although not completely exempt, was provided a de facto exempt status because of
specific reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to its "security." Further, the President retained
the right to make exceptions at his discretion under "extraordinary circumstances" or to offset
any regional arms imbalances in which countries "friendly" to the U.S. appeared to be threatened.
The major provisions of President Carter's program were as follows:
1. "Reduce to FY77 totals, the FY78 Military Assistance Program (MAP), and
FMS commitments." At the end of FY77, the U.S. had a backlog of undelivered FMS approach-
ing $36 billion. One year later, on 30 September 1978, the FMS backlog was $43.5 billion. The
Presidential policy of restraint on transfers of all weapons and weapon implements for FY78 re-
quired the dollar value of new orders that are FMS and MAP to be less than the FY77 total of
$9.3 billion (measured in 1976 dollars).
The ceiling on FY78 arms transfer agreements was reduced from the FY77 ceiling by
$740 million. This reduction meant that, for FY78, which began 1 October 1977 and ended on
30 September 1978, new commitments for weapons and weapon implements made under the
FMS and MAP to all countries (less those exempt) would not exceed $8.6 billion. Calculated on
constant FY76 dollars, this was a reduction of eight percent.
2. "The U.S. will not be the first country to introduce weapons of increased sophis-
tication into a region, nor will it permit the sale of U.S. weapons systems abroad until they are
fully deployed with U.S. Forces."
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These limitations attempted to restrain the shift toward sale of the most advanced U.S.
weapons that accompanied the shift from military aid to arms sales. Outside of the Middle East,
major sales of advanced equipment had recently gone to U.S. allies already specifically exempted
from the guideline. Recent administration decisions, however, made it seem unlikely that this
policy would be strictly or consistently enforced. For example, in July 1977 President Carter
approved the sale of seven Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft to Iran for $1.2
billion. These expensive radar and communications aircraft represent one of the most advanced
and sophisticated U.S. weapons systems (Lydenberg, 1977). In the face of substantial congres-
sional opposition, President Carter withdrew this proposed sale for further Administration
consideration.
3. "Development and signficant modification of advanced weapons systems solely
for export will not be permitted."
"The Administration has approved preliminary discussions which may lead to the sale of the
F-18L to various NATO countries, Australia and Japan." (Lydenberg, 1977)
4. The new policy would prohibit coproduction agreements of "significant"
weapons in countries not specifically exempt from the Carter policy.
5. The U.S. "may stipulate" that weapon systems it is selling can not be retrans-
ferred under any circumstances by the purchasing nation to a third country.
6. U.S. Embassies and military representatives abroad will not be permitted to pro-
mote arms sales, and corporate representatives must obtain State Department authorization for
any promotion of arms sales abroad.
This policy was intended to insure that intiatives of arms sales remain under State Department
control and to counter criticism that corporate or DOD representatives had in the past pro-
moted sales (McNamara era) without State Department knowledge.
Recent decisions by President Carter to proceed with the sales of sophisticated weapon
systems to Israel and Egypt (and even offers to Somalia) raise a serious question as to the extent
that the guidelines enumerated above would be effectively enforced by the administration.
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Certainly Congress was taking a more active role in the restraint of U.S. arms sales abroad. The
Carter policy statement, nevertheless, did break with the tradition established by former Ad-
ministrations in the recent past.
20

III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the roles of the various agencies and departments,
within the Navy organization, that participate in the FMS process, to gain an insight into the
current modus operandi of the FMS organization confronting a field activity. As can be surmised
from the discussions in Chapter II on the history of FMS, much of FMS functioning is subject
to the dictates of foreign policy.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides the authority for both economic
assistance and the Military Assistance Program. Foreign Military Sales are made under the au-
thority of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
These three acts and their respective amendments establish the basic policies and provide au-
thorities, measures and restrictions for our present Security Assistance Program, and more
specifically for FMS programs. Each act is reviewed annually by Congress and amendments
and funds needed to carry out the program are authorized.
It should be recognized, that a FMS, as authorized under the Arms Export and Control
Act of 1976, is a government-to-government sale. The U.S. government contracts with a manu-
facturer or tasks a field activity for the item or service, takes title to the item and transfers title
to the foreign government upon delivery. Such an arrangement interpositions the Department of
Defense between U.S. contractors supplying the military goods or services and the foreign
government, as well as implying subsequent DOD monitoring and management of the contrac-
tual effort by the U.S. contractor.
In addition to the unique contractual interposition, there are international considerations.
FMS necessitates agreements with foreign governments so that understandings can be formalized
and made a matter of record. The FMS legislation provides the legal basis for agreements are of
two forms: treaties, which are formal and require ratification by Congress, and Executive
Agreements which are between designated representatives of the President and the Foreign
Ministers of the country concerned. Most international arrangements are of the "executive
agreement" variety.
The Congress authorizes the Foreign Military Sales Program by enactment of iaws. These
laws are brought about by changes in the world environment and reflect the foreign policy of
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the United States at any given point in time. The sense of the Congress, as expressed in these
acts is intended to convey general guidance as well as objectives and restraints. In order to
ensure that the intent of the law is being adhered to, the Congress requires that the President
submit to Congress for their review and disapproval, if desired, all potential Foreign Military
Sales prior to consummation. As a further assurance that the FMS is being conducted within the
guidelines, the Congress requires annual reports from the President on FMS status. In addition,
there are five committees that regularly solicit data and information concerning the status of
FMS. Such solicitations often result from hearings on particularly sensitive transactions that
have been initiated by the Executive Branch.
The President has the responsibility to determine foreign government eligibility to pur-
chase defense armaments and implements and provide reports to Congress and standing com-
mittees concerning FMS. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports to the President,
with its International Affairs Divison being responsible for FMS Activity. The National Security
Council advises the President concerning FMS Policy. The Secretary of State reports to the
President concerning FMS responsibilities that have been delegated and effects coordination
with the Secretary of Defense in his areas of responsibility.
The Congress has continually insisted that the Security Assistance Program be considered
as an integral part of the U.S. foreign policy and that the Secretary of State maintain firm con-
trol over the total program. That concern and desire is explicitly stated in the Arms Export
Control Act and in Executive Order 11501 (December 24, 1969). As a result of this realization,
the Secretary of Defense alone cannot decide which countries will be included in the program,
since this is a principal responsibility of the President. Former Secretary of State Kissinger has
described the overall responsibilitiy of the State Department for FMS "as putting into practice
the three basic principles of the Nixon Doctrine, which represent the basic foundation of our
foreign policy" (Cullin, 1977). Sales have, in the past, improved foreign countries internal order




Extensive liaison is maintained between the Department of State and the Department of
Defense to insure the coordination of U.S. political, military and economic objectives. Within
the Department of State, a political-military board, chaired by the Undersecretary of State for
Security Assistance, meet, regularly to discuss FMS. Major sales are weighed for their foreign
policy implications.
The State Department, in addition to approval authority over FMS, also controls commer-
cial sales of military exports. The Mutual Security Act requires the State Department to grant
export licenses for any military arms or munitions items. Therefore, the Secretary of State
has full control and decision authority over all military hardware being exported from the
United States regardless of the source or means of payment. (Cullin, 1977). In the Foreign
Military Sales Program, the Department of Defense (DOD) is the primary agency that imple-
ments the sale. The scope and responsibilities suggest total involvement:
1. Assisting the customer in determining its requirements as related to a specific
system or support. This responsibility was particularly significant to the mission of the Military
Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGS).
2. Contracting for the weapon system development production and delivery to the
foreign government.
3. Providing training, construction and logistic support.
4. Collecting the purchase price from the foreign government and paying the
contractor.
5. Management of the contract.
6. Sale of defense articles and defense services from stocks of DOD.
In carrying out its responsibilities the DOD provides pricing, production, scheduling, and
delivery details to eligible foreign governments, on approval of the sale by the Department of
State and determination that the sale will be in the national interest of the U.S. After the re-
quest for purchase has been approved, usually based upon an inquiry for Price and Availability
(P&A) of a defense system or service from a foreign government, the DOD responds to the
request with the issuance of a Letter of Offer . . .(A Letter of Offer becomes a Letter of Offer
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and Acceptance (LOA) upon signature by the foreign government.) In addition, the law provides
that for orders of $25 million or more, the DOD must submit the proposal to the Congress for
review and concurrence.
Once a FMS case has been approved by the DOD, all implementing actions to actually
furnish the material or service are left to whichever military department has cognizance of the
particular product or service and industry or industries. It should be noted, however, that the
military departments are party to the transactions from the outset. They do not, as a matter of
law, have any authority on their own to make a sale. During the negotiations, they are responsible
for providing price, service, availability and lead time data. After the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs [ASD (ISA)], the principal staff assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense, approves the sale, the military departments are responsible for procurement and
shipment of the material. The departments use their normal logistic organizations to handle
their transactions. (DOD Directive 5123.3)
The interface between the purchasing country and the DOD is the MAAG, a part of the
U.S. country team. The MAAG has the responsibility of explaining FMS procedures to the host
country and for advising them of valid requirements. Usually the MAAG is used as the conduit
for FMS negotiations, in conjunction with or independent of the country's embassy in Washing-
ton working directly with the DOD. The role of the MAAG's has been modified somewhat by
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Section 104).
After September 30, 1977, no Military Assistance Advisory Group,
military mission, or other organization of United States military per-
sonnel performing similiar military advisory functions under this Act
may operate in any foreign country unless specifically authorized by
the Congress.
An additional provision of the Act states:
The President may assign not more than three members of the Armed
Forces of the United States to the Chief of each U.S. Diplomatic
Mission to perform such functions as such Chief of Mission determines
are necessary with respect to internation military education and train-
ing provided . . ., to sales of defense articles and services under the
Arms Export Control Act, or to such other international Security Assis-
tance Programs as the President may designate. After September 30,
1977, no such functions or related activities may be performed by any
defense attaches assigned, detailed, or attached to the U.S. Diplomatic
Mission in any foreign country. (Cullin, 1977)
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It is expected that this action by Congress will severely limit the information available to the
Defense industry, as well as to the program managers who are responsible for anticipating many
of the problems associated with providing products and services to foreign countries.
The U.S. Navy role in support of FMS is implemented through the Education and Training
Command and the Material Command. Security Assistance organization in the Navy is structured
into four echelons: policy, management, review and implementation. Elements of this
organization are as follows:
1. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
(MRA&L) renders top level policy decisions concerning FMS procurement as it impacts on the
naval community. He is a member of the Navy FMS Steering Group and is a policy maker
regarding material acquisitions and training.
2. The FMS Steering Group is chaired by Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO,
OP
-90) and is composed of ASN(MRA&L), Chief of Naval Material (CNM), Chief of Naval
Education and Training, and all principal flag officers heading major OPNAV staff elements.
This group meets periodically to review, FMS programs, address policy and procedural issues,
and to resolve problems related to FMS that require high level decisions.
3. The Foreign Military Training Board is composed of the Chief of Naval Educa-
tion and Training and OPNAV staff elements concerned with training.
4. The Foreign Disclosure Review Board is composed of those OPNAV flag officers
concerned with equipments or training that are classified in nature. Their deliberations involve
the feasibility and appropriateness of releasing classified information and /or equipment to ser-
vices of other nations through FMS.
5. The Security Assistance Division of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations
serves as the Navy focal point for FMS for the State Department, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Congress and foreign governments. It coordinates and processes all Navy and Marine
Corps-related FMS cases, ensuring that Department of the Navy implementation is consistent
and that every internal Navy cognizant authority is consulted and considered.
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6. The primary function of the Security Assistance Division (OP-63) of the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations is to establish and promulgate overall USN Security Assistance pro-
gram policy and to negotiate and sign, Foreign Military Sales transactions for the Navy.
7. Within the Naval Material Command, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Mater-
ial Security Assistance (ADCNM) (NMAT-80F) under the Deputy Chief of Material (DCNM) for
acquisition (NMAT-08), is the counterpart to OP-63 in OPNAV. The function of ADCNM is to
provide centralized planning, coordination and management of FMS Cases within the Naval
Material Command (NMC) and to provide the central point of contact for foreign customers
after the case has progressed to the material acquisition stage. The ADCNM controls and coor-
dinates the implementation of policy decisions in NMC.
8. Naval Material Command is organized into five functional commodity com-
mands; for example, the Naval Sea Systems Command. These commands are responsible for ac-
quisition and logistic support of NMC cognizance weapons systems, equipment, training and
services contracted for under FMS. It is these commands and their field activities that are the
working level of the material acquisition process.
It is important to note and emphasize that in implementing FMS cases the Navy uses the
same resources and support organization that are used in acquisition and support of U.S. pro-
grams. There is no formal organization established to satisfy specific FMS needs. There are,
however, offices established in each Systems command to administer and monitor those FMS
programs being managed within that command and to act as control coordination for all FMS
activities within the purview of the systems command. In addition, they provide policy and
guidance to the respective acquisition managers.
Processing a FMS case through the Navy begins with a request for material or training by
a foreign nation. In a typical FMS case, the request would be relayed to Security Assistance
Divison, CNO, either directly from the foreign embassy concerned, from its counterpart U.S.
embassy, or from DSAA or the State Department. This request would be reviewed initially
by the OPNAV staff for of possible impact on Navy resources. If foreign disclosure of classified
material is at issue, the Foreign Disclosure Review Board is consulted. If the case involves a
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major procurement or negatively impacts on the Navy training program, the next step is for the
FMS Steering Group to review the case to determine what significant issues are involved and
whether or not it is feasible to proceed with the contract. The FMS Steering Group focuses high
level attention on the case; with group concurrence, the case reaches its most important Service-
level decision milestone. After completing a satisfactory CNO FMS Sterling Group Review, the
case is forwarded to either the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Material
(CNM), or the Chief of Naval Education and Training, as applicable, for price and availability
information.
Within the Naval Material Command, the case is coordinated by the Assistant Deputy Chief
of Naval Material for Security Assistance [ADCNM (SA)] (NMAT-08F), who tasks the appro-
priate systems commands. The systems commands communicate with industry, Navy supply
managers, and the Chief of Naval Education and Training organization to develop the informa-
tion necessary to build a Price and Availability (P&A) response to the foreign nation concerned.
This statement is forwarded via ADCNM to OP63 for final review and coordination with ASN
(MRA&L) for an evaluation of impact on Navy resources. After ASN clearance, OP-63 prepares
a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA: the FMS contract, DD form 1513) which, once ap-
proved, is processed through DSAA, the Department of State or Congress, in accordance with
current directives, after which OP-63 transmits its LOA to the foreign government.
Upon acceptance of the LOA and signature by the foreign government, the Commandant
of the Marine Corp (CMC), Chief of Naval Material (CNM), or Chief of Naval Education and
Training (CNET) as appropriate, implement the contractual agreement. Appropriate systems
commands enter into contracts with the industries concerned and manage the case until com-
pletion. ADCNM (SA) coordinates the projects between various systems commands, monitors
the progress of the projects and implements policy guidance provided by CNO. Finally, the Navy
International Logistics Office (NAVILCO, to be discussed in the next chapter) provides finan-
cial accounting management and the data for Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC) used
in billing to the foreign government.
The final organizational level (at least in Washington) is the program office (See Figure 4,
showing NAVSEASYSCOM). Those program offices associated with foreign sales are normally
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designated as a result of their relationship with the system to be purchased. If for example,
torpedo tubes are to be manufactured, a matrix type organization would be used to accom-
plish the function coordination.
As stated earlier, the organization in the Navy established for FMS is essentially structured
to dovetail into existing acquistion and logistic organizations. There are some proponents who
would suggest that the Navy establish a separate system to focus on the myraid of problems in-
herent in Foreign Military Sales. Several attempts for addition civilian manpower ceiling points
to accomplish the FMS mission, have not met with success. In addition, the thrust has been to
reduce all ceiling points thus making it more difficult to accommodate the FMS mission. This
subject will be discussed in later chapters.
The Program offices coordinate with private industry or field activities for implementation
and completion of the FMS Case.
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IV. Financial Management and Control Systems
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Financial Management and Control Systems
that work to realize the "objectives" of the FMS program. Once a FMS case has been approved
for implementation the responsibility (in this case, for the U.S. Navy) for the specific data on
pricing, contracting, production, delivery and the manufacturing/industrial community becomes
that of the military departments. The essential management and control rest in implementation,
and it is because of this unique aspect of the U.S. governmental system, that it is necessary to
explore the financial management and control systems utilized.
The Department of Defense follows a policy of uniform application of pricing and cost
criteria for sales of Defense products and services to eligible governments and international
organizations, such as NATO. Essentially, the policy provides that all costs incurred in FMS
transactions will be recovered. Provisions within the structure of the DD Form 1513 (Letter of
Offer and Acceptance) include final after delivery adjustments of all direct and indirect costs. It
further stipulates the charging of all accessorial charges, administrative fees and other chargable
miscellaneous cost. The price quotations that accompany the final agreement (that is the
contract, DD Form 1513) are estimates only and subject to changes principally resulting from
U.S. legal requirements (DOD Instruction 5105. 38-M).
Directing our attention to new procurements, prices of defense articles and services pro-
cured for eligible foreign governments must include recovery of full DOD contract cost, in-
cluding the cost of government materials (GAO Report, 1978). In addition, the purchaser is
required to pay any damages or costs that may accrue from the purchaser's cancellation of the
contract. Authorized surcharges are added to the contract cost and included in the billing.
In general, defense articles are priced on the same basis as the cost principle used in pricing
defense contracts of items for DOD use. However, recognition is given to reasonable and allo-
cable contractor costs that are justified in connection with a particular sale.
The costs of deviations from U.S. system configuration and special technical data desired
by a foreign government are included as a charge to the foreign government. This is in addition
to the average units standard price or other normal U.S. charges.
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Prices of defense articles and services sold to eligible foreign governments include asses-
sorial cost and administrative charges. The assessorial cost represent certain expenses incident to
issues, sales, and transfers of material that are not included in the standard price or contract
cost of material, such as packing, crating and handling cost, transportation cost, port loading
and unloading cost, and prepositioning costs.
Administrative charges for the use of the DOD logistics system are added to prices of
contractual services and nonexcess material sold to eligible foreign governments in order to
recover the DOD costs. Such charges are made in lieu of separate computations of charges for
the cost of general management and administrative expenses pertaining to supply and procure-
ment, services and other DOD costs that are difficult to isolate.
The rate charged for administrative costs is prescribed in DOD Instruction 2140.1, of 9
March 1977. Supply Support arrangements will include an administrative charge of 5-percent
added to the basic sales price of contractual services and/or material to be provided. FMS, other
than Supply Support arrangements, include an administrative charge of 3 percent added to the
cost of contractual services, new procurements, or material from stock to be provided.
Rates for assessorial and administrative costs are subject to review at least every two years.
Requests for exception (in the case of unresolved disputes, or deviations when it can be shown
that such deviations are in the best interest of the U.S. government) can be submitted through
the Director, DSAA, and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for resolution or
approval. These requests must contain the basis or justification and supporting data for the
exception.
Defense policy indicates that the purchase price to a foreign government includes DOD
nonrecurring costs associated with the reasearch, development and production of major defense
equipment offered to foreign governments. The calculated equitable share of such costs to be
borne by the foreign buyer is included in the sales price, unless waived. The waiver, in part or
whole, can only be made in accordance with the conditions set forth in DOD Directive 2140.2
and submitted to the Director," DSAA.
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Sales of defense articles that involve the case of government owned facilities are priced to
include a 4-percent asset use charge, in accordance with DOD Directive 2140.1. Sales of defense
articles that involve the use of government-owned tooling are priced to include a rental charge
for the use of the equipment. Waiver of these charges, can be made only in accordance with the
provisions of DOD Directive 2140.1 for the asset use charge, and Defense Acquisition Regula-
tion 13-406 for the rental of government-owned tooling and equipment.
The goal of FMS financial management is to conduct the FMS program at no cost to the
U.S. government, while insuring prompt and complete service to the customer nation. The
DD Form 1573 Offer and Acceptance contract makes it mandatory for the foreign government
to pay for the full value of the transaction, regardless of terms of sale specified for the indi-
vidual case, thus insuring cost recovery.
The rapid growth of FMS and the different financial systems of the respective military
departments, led to the establishment of the Joint Financial Management Office (JFMO) to per-
form the accounting for FMS trust funds, billing for amounts due under the various FMS cases,
and the collection of FMS cost receipts.
The initial proposal was modified by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 9 September
1976, and implementing instructions to phase in the accomplishment of the FMS financial
centralization were issued by ASD (ISA) in October 1976. The consolidation of FMS accounting
records and monies has been coordinated by DSAA/JFMO and all three military departments.
Initially the responsibility for centralized control was fragmented between DSAA and the
Air Force Accounting Finance Center (AFAFC). On 6 March 1977, the DSAA/JFMO and the
Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC) (formerly AFAFC) organizations were merged
to eliminate the manager/operator dichotomy. The consolidated office, nominally now known
as SAAC, is commanded by a Major General, USAF. On 6 May 1977, the SAAC released the
first billing statement to all FMS purchasers.
The function of SAAC is to serve essentially as the DOD financial executive for the FMS
program. It will validate and report FMS performance, operate the FMS accounting and billing
systems, and manage the delivery and financial accounting systems.
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SAAC and the military departments interface on all FMS financial matters. The Letter of
Offer, as well as related price and availability data, are prepared within the military departments
themselves. Letters of Offer are then processed to the SAAC at the time they are provided to
prospective purchasers to insure the proposed sale is properly reported to Congress. When the
customer nation signs the Letter of Acceptance, a copy of the acceptance (together with any
required initial deposit) is forwarded to the SAAC. Assuming the Letter of Acceptance is in
order, and required initial deposits have been received, the SAAC issues obligation authority to
the military department.
After the military departments receives obligation authority, implementing directives are
prepared and sent to performing activities such as systems commands. The systems commands
(NAVSEA) prepare requisitions and purchase orders that request shipment or procurement of
the material/service from DOD depots or contractor facilities, as required. When the depots
receive material release orders, they determine whether the material is on hand and, if so, ship
the material directly to the customer nation. Simultaneously, they provide systems commands
with mutual release confirmations indicating that material has been delivered. When the systems
commands receive advice of delivery, they report the delivery to the SAAC which, in turn, posts
the delivery to the country's billing statement. The military department is then reimbursed for
its cost. A billing statement, DD Form 645, is then sent to the customer nation, which makes
payment into the FMS Trust Fund. The SAAC must have deposits on hand and in advance of
delieveries or progress payments. This is a requirement stemming from the Arms Export Control
Act. The methodology used to insure compliance with the law and to have funds on hand in
advance is accomplished through the financial forecast prepared by contracting officers and
supply managers and forwarded to the SAAC.
Simply put, the flow of funds is as follows: The customer nation makes deposits into
SAAC Trust Fund, and if a FMS case is financed under the reimbursable method, the SAAC
pays the military department when a delivery is reported to SAAC. The military department in
turn pays production contractors or deposits the collection into its direct appropriations. If,
however, the direct-cite method of financing is used, the FMS Trust Fund is cited directly
and payments go, in effect, directly from the trust fund account to production contractors.
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To improve the existing system and to be more responsive to Congress, OMB, OSD, and
the military departments, the SAAC currently has in operation the Defense Integrated Finan-
cial System (DIFS) for FMS. The new system encompasses a 2.5 billion character data base and
interfaces all aspects of the FMS financial management operation as directed by OSD (Comp-
troller).
The DIFS system is capable of providing a data base of verifiable accuracy, sufficiently
interactive to fulfill mechanized general ledger, double entry accural accounting. Further, it can
furnish a comprehensive data base that is accessible to selected FMS managers throughout DOD
on a real-time basis, enhancing control of each FMS case from start to finish and ensuring full
compliance with the Arms Export Control Act.
Separate trust funds are established for each military department to account for payment
received from customer nations and for disbursement to suppliers for FMS cash sales. Those
funds can either be cited directly by DOD on contracts for FMS items for that customer, can be
used to reimburse military department appropriations for deliveries of items initially procured
by those appropriations, or to make progress payments.
Cash payments often will be received for an individual FMS case, that are in excess of
the final value of that particular case. With customer nation approval, these funds can be re-
tained in the customer's trust fund and applied against his other FMS cases. Upon customer
demand, however, these overpayments will be refunded at the time the FMS case is closed,
provided there are no collection delinquencies for other FMS cases for that customer.
As stated earlier, preparation and implementation of DD Form 1573 Letter of Offer
are the resonsibility of the military department. They, too, must establish estimated prices and
availabilities of products and services for sale. In addition, they are responsible for negotiating
the terms of sale for cash sales in accordance with policy guidance provided by DSAA. They are
responsible for establishing the management systems required to finance, acount and report ac-
complishment for each individual case.
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The U.S. Navy International Logistics Control Office (NAVILCO) has as its mission the
operation of the Requisition and Navy Financial Accounting Control Center for FMS, as well as
grants of supplies and equipment. Within the NAVILCO organization, the comptroller is the
focal point regarding interface with SAAC.
The implementing agency, such as NAVSEA, sends to NAVILCO its financial require-
ments. Receiving obligational authority from the SAAC via the Navy comptroller, and acting as
a synthesizer, NAVILCO loads all this data onto its computer files by case, setting up certain
controls. In addition, it passes obligational authority to the respective implementing activity,
which permits such activity to initiate supply action.
The computer system is geared to reject requisitions when a pre-determined percentage of
the obligational authority is attained. At that time, the country program manager will manually
review the requisition. He can overrule the controls or redistribute the funding authority within
the case. If obligations are anticipated to exceed the authorization, NAVILCO will prepare a
request for additional funding. Periodic reports to SAAC provide updated information reflecting
the status of obligational authority and the actual obligations incurred during the period.
In an effort to manage the expenditure control, NAVILCO directs its attention to protect-
ing the dollar value that has been provided to the U.S. for payment of obligations incurred in
support of individual cases. The funds are held by SAAC and are not provided to anyone ex-
cept upon request. NAVILCO, via NAVCOMPT, makes a request to SAAC on a quarterly
basis with an estimate of the expenditure authority that is anticipated for the following
quarter. When notified of the expenditure authority, manual country ledger controls are
established. There is a separate ledger for each individual country. The funds are held, pending
a request by a paying office to make an expenditure against a particular country's fund. The
request is usually made by telephone. If funds are available, NAVILCO will release them to the




If for example, funds are not available for a particular country for which a paying office
is requesting authorization, the request is refused, and immediate transactions with NAVCOMPT
and SAAC are begun to determine if funding is to be available. If so, it is obtained. If not, the
actual disbursement is held, pending clearance or direction from SAAC. Control of the system
is via reports made monthly to NAVCOMPT and SAAC.
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V. FIELD ACTIVITY VIEW AND PERSPECTIVE OF
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN A BUREAUCRATIC FRAMEWORK
This chapter analyses the field activity's perception of the FMS program process and the
problems involved in execution of taskings provided by the implementing command. At first
glance, the FMS program can best be described as bewildering in its effort to both conduct
business with international customers and to coordinate the efforts of field activities in support
of those business efforts. The inherent nature of the U.S. government is best described as
confusing; the purposes, functions, responsibilities and interrelationships are often vaguely
understood. As a result of efforts to accommodate each case separately, published manuals,
directives and instructions frequently appear confusing and contradictory. The process from
beginning, (a country request) to the end, (the delivery of the product or service) seems light
years long, stymied by reviews, impact statements, policy changes and poor quality pricing and
availability data. Goals and objectives seem neither very well defined nor permanent, thereby
causing great confusion and the over expenditure of energy and resources.
In an effort to analyze and understand the views of the field activities, it is helpful to re-
view the nature of the naval organization. The Navy, as the other services, has chosen not to
establish a separate, accountable organization to implement the FMS program, but rather in-
corporates the entire effort within its current organizational structure. The realization that the
Navy was structured to conduct war and to acquire implements of war and not to conduct a FMS
program has not been fully appreciated by those who direct the Navy. This lack of appreciation
causes conflicting signals to be promulgated within the chain of command concerning ways of
conducting FMS.
The Navy is a classic hierarchial bureaucracy. Nevertheless, many personnel, particularly
those in uniform, who profess to be antithetical to the traditional "bureaucrat," find that the
structure inherently identified with bureaucracy affects dramatically the fields activities per-
ception of the FMS program. A review of the characteristics of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946), will
establish the relevance of the bureaucratic organizational definition to the U.S. Navy:
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1. The sphere of influence of each individual is clearly defined.
2. The authority associated with each office or position in the organization is
hierarchical; that is, every office is subordinate to some higher office.
3. The rules for operating the organization are rational and intentional, and there
is an orderly system of files established for maintenance of the organization's history.
4. Each individual receives thorough training for a new position before he assumes
the job.
5. There is obedience to the position or to rank, but it is not related to the personal
relationship with the individual. One is not required to like or to associate with a superior in
other than a professional manner.
6. Promotion is based on senority within the organization or on particularly note-
worthy achievement. The superiors judge the qualifications of the indivudal for advancement
and increased responsibility within the organization.
7. Individual behavior and discipline are based on the position held within the or-
ganization and not on ownership of a part of the operation.
The management system in the bureaucratic organization is equally structured (Bums,
1953):
1. There is a differentiation of the various functional tasks, as in job specialization.
2. There is an extensive use of advanced technology to improve the processes with
the organization. As the means are developed, however, there is a marked tendency to ignore
the ends of the concern. This is sometimes referred to as "means-ends inversion."
3. Success within the organization is highly dependent on recognition of an in-
dividual's task by his superiors.
4. Both the rights and the obligations of the individual and of the organization are
precisely defined.
5. Responsibilities within the organization are applied to the various functional
positions and not to the individuals themselves.
6. Control, authority and communication are hierarchical. This means that informa-
tion and power are passed vertically, and there usually is no mechanism for lateral transfer of
either one.
7. The knowledge of the real nature of situations (the "big picture"), the recon-
ciliation of task assignments and information mismatches, and the assessment of relevance to
both task and information is exclusively a function of top management. The higher in the
hierarchy, the greater the knowledge and the greater the relevance of the various inputs to that
level.
8. Because of the vertical power and information passing, and because of the super-
iority of knowledge possessed by the upper levels, nearly all interactions will be vertical. This
ensures that one of the parties will have more of the valuable commodities of power or informa-




9. Membership in the organization is conditional upon obedience to the superior
and loyalty to the organization.
10. There is more importance attached to local knowledge than to general know-
ledge. This breeds an organization composed of highly specialized "resident experts" with only
the highest levels aware of or interested in the overall strategy of the organization.
The institution of bureaucracy in the United States, began to flourish in the late 1800 's as
the industrial world became able to support the larger and larger organizations necessary to
accomplish the multiplying tasks facing it. Although the scientific and manufacturing worlds
were undergoing rapid and drastic changes, the great social movements had not yet begun, nor
had technological progress found its way into the everyday lives of the common man. Exploita-
tion of the masses was tolerated, and the government had not yet begun to exert its regulatory
might. Thus the environment was relatively calm, and bureaucracy was able to develop un-
molested and unchallenged by other organizational forms. This adaption of bureaucracy to a
benign environment is well recognized.
"Bureaucracy thrives in a highly competitive, undifferentiated and
stable environment, such as the climate of its youth, the Industrial Re-
volution. A pyramidal structure of authority, with power concentrated
in the hands of a few with the knowledge and resources to control an
entire enterprise was, and is, an eminently suitable social arrangement
for routinized tasks." (Bennis, 1965)
In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of bureaucratic organizations, one must recog-
nize that there are several distinct advantages to this organizational form. One category has
come to be called the technical advantages of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946). These are precision,
speed, unambiguity, continuity, and the reduction of material and personnel costs. Other ad-
vantages, that could be called non-technical, are the predictability of the bureaucratic organi-
zational response under various conditions, well defined and written success criteria, and the
existence of a widespread, highly refined "corporate knowledge" that usually resides in the
informal organization.
These advantages, however, may not be sufficient to enable the bureaucratic organization
to operate effectively in today's world. By reviewing briefly the current nature of the environ-
mental forces that impact on the organization (technical, human, regulatory, economic), it




1. Technical Forces. There is nearly an exponential growth in these forces in
recent years. The advances are so rapid that the ability to produce state-of-the-art weapons and
sensors lags well behind discoveries. The sheer mass of scientific and technological information
that must be digested by today's Naval officer or DOD executive is staggering, yet survival may
very well depend upon it. The task of gathering and synthesizing useful information becomes
extremely time consuming, impacting on the ability of the unit to act effectively.
2. Human Forces. There are many social variations that impact upon the organ-
ization. Some of these within the Navy are the non-economic matters that are becoming increas-
ingly important to the individual, the shift in behavior related to the increased importance of
individual values in the place of organizational values, and the muniscule changes in managerial
techniques over the decades that cause increased organizational dissatisfaction (Bower, 1975).
3. Regulatory Forces. These are continually changing and increasing, both from
within and from outside the Navy. The significance of this factor was repeatedly pointed out
by the respondents to CDR Mumford's article (Mumford, 1977). Three factors that were con-
sidered to be overwhelming by Navy Unit Commanders were: the extensive follow-up reporting
that seniors required, the additional instructions that were showered upon them and that so
confused the issue that required actions were often contradictory, and a feeling of emphasis on
the procedures and a discrediting of the effectiveness of the results. In addition, congressional
actions are increasingly influencing the management of the Navy and the FMS program.
4. Economic Forces. Cuts in military budgets, the increasing share of the budget
that must go to support the personnel areas, and decreasing material reliability all contribute to
the constant state of fiscal fluctuation that must be faced.
In the above brief analysis of the Navy's environment, it is quite evident that this environ-
ment cannot be classified as stable. The conditions are further complicated by the fluctuating
world tensions and corresponding Navy commitments that are an integral part of any military
organization's existence. The disadvantages of the bureaucratic structure becomes even more
severe when the organization is enmeshed inextricably in an unstable environment. A review of
some of those disadvantages follows.
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A common bureaucratic tendency when faced with instability is a firm reliance on the
boundaries of responsibility (Burn, 1963). This is marked by the passing of problems to a point
in the organization where responsibility is known and accepted, or barring that, passing the prob-
lems to a superior for resolution. The result is nearly always an overloading of the superiors.
They are required by the organization to be involved in most decisions and are responsbile for
almost all coordination. The appropriate level for the decision or for the coordination may be
several levels below that where the action is finally taken. Such overloading of the superior
creates multiple goal conflicts on an individual vice an organizational level. This results in
a strong tendency for suboptimal accomplishment of the simultaneous requirements.
A second tendency for the bureaucracy is to continue to differentiate in order to meet the
needs of the environment as it continually changes. We are reminded of the Saudi Arabia and
Iran programs in the Chief of Naval Operations Security Assistance Division that were segregated
out to meet the specific needs of those countries. As new needs are generated by the environ-
ment, the organization creates a new specialist to handle it. This may involve the creation of
whole new groups or staffs within the hierarchy. And, as the specialists multiply, the organiza-
tion finds that the various elements are at best marginally capable of communicating with each
other, so internal interpreters and intermediaries are created for the purpose of "liaison" (Burns
and Stalker, 1961). Of course, as previously stated, the responsibility for the relevance of all of
this lies with the superior, but it will probably be accepted as a natural outgrowth of his coor-
dination and decision-making duties.
Another tendency of bureaucracies in environment of change is evidenced by the decision-
making habits of the leaders. Because of their limited exposure to the many refined decisions
models and management techniques available today, there is a marked tendency for bureaucratic
managers to categorize both their decision-making aids and the problems that they face (March
and Simon, 1958). In most cases they do match the categories somewhat so that the selected
solution is in the same general area as the problem, but the exact fit may not be right. This also
results in a greatly reduced search for new and better alternative solutions.
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The individuals within the bureaucracy are subject to numerous forces that produce a
dispersion of their commitments. By virtue of their membership in the organization, they are
required to be committed to the organization itself. But this is diluted by the individual 's com-
mitment to his superior (both in the forms of hero-worship and of having to support the super-
ior in order to survive), by a commitment to himself (especially if his self-image is one of the
"comer" in the organization), by a commitment to his work group as an ascendent system
within the organization, and finally by a commitment to the informal organiztion because it
meets his social and psychological needs. The end result of this dispersion of commitment is
that the organization receives the pauper's share of the individual's concerns.
The final disadvantageous tendency of bureaucracy that is to be considered is the poli-
tical maneuvering that goes on within the organization. This is operant at several levels. The first
is the internal system -vs- system level. Here the established subgroups in the bureaucracy unite
to reject the newer groups and insure that they (the original ones) will not be replaced. This is
summarized in the following:
"When changes are manifested not only by the intrusion of new kinds
of tasks and new kinds of resources, or even by the recruitment of 'new
kinds of people,' but by clothing them in new institutional forms, they
take on the appearance of a threat to the other parts of the existing
order, instead of a source of life. ... In brief, what happens is that a
plan revised in terms of changing the working organization fails to ma-
terialize because factors of status and politics play a determining role,
and nobody realizes, or rather, admits, that these are real problems to
be dealt with. When these factors intervene, as they must, they are re-
garded as illegitmate if they are recognized at all, and the person who is
throught to be advancing (or resisting) claims for increased power or
status is condumned as more concerned for himself than for the job."
(Burns and Stalker, 1961)
Political maneuvering also takes place at the individual level. This may be rather subtle,
but it can be recognized as an outgrowth of the regulations and increased rigidity of behavior of
individuals as they rely on the limits of their responsibilities. The defensibility of the indivi-
dual's behavior is greatly increased, even when his legitmate refusal to act causes widespread
problems elsewhere. The recent examples of organizational distress caused by employees utiliz-
ing "working to the rule" as a coercive technique indicate the potential danger to large organiza-
tions. A proliferation of "book men" is a sympton of organizations that are preceeding down
a somewhat pathological path.
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The above brief description of some of the characteristics of bureaucratic structure of the
Navy will permit an examination of the relationships between field activites and their involve-
ment in the FMS process. To reiterate several points made earlier, it should be noted that the
U.S. Navy has a primary mission of war (whether the control of sea lanes, the projection of sea
power, or accomplishing strategic objective denoted by the Commander in Chief) and acquisition
of all the implements to support the war objective. Another point is that the U.S. Navy is
not a business in the sense of providing goods and services for consideration. The U.S. Navy
receives "considerations" in the form of operating revenues allocated from general revenue
streams that are not tied to what it performs as a mission, but from taxes and reimbursables.
The United States, under President Carter's present foreign policy is in a dilemna and some-
what uncomfortable, in attempting both to control arms sales and to sell them simultaneously.
The mixed signals have flowed down the chain of command to the field activities. Recog-
nizing the operational structure of the U.S. FMS program as it flows from Washington to the
field activity, the field activity is in a reactionary position. It receives taskings and fundings
from the systems commands. The tasks are accomplished by the field activity and reported back
to the systems commands. The field activities consulted expressed the belief that the interna-
tional customer should be treated much the same as the U.S. customer.
There is some difficulty in treating international customers the same as the U.S. Navy. The
international customer is paying for goods or service and has expectations as to the value to be
received for his dollars. The Navy customer is motivated by a need and does not have the option
of going elsewhere to acquire. The Navy customer has neither a standard of expectation nor
does his complaint carry the same clout as does that of the international customer. The interna-
tional customer has more leverage and therefore can not be treated in the same way. He should
be provided the kind of attention appropriate for the monetary consideration the U.S. will gain
by the sales transaction.
In concert with the question of treatment and monetary consideration is the determination
of cost for services rendered, government furnished equipment, or government furnished facilities.
In discussion with RADM Engels of NAVSEA, it was determined that at present there is no
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logical, rational means of determining the cost to charge international customers in the FMS
program. At the Naval Ordnance Station in Louisville, estimators use a "Class F" estimation for
all the Price and Availabilities that they provide to NAVSEA. There are several factors that
cause this basic difficulty in the FMS program. Perhaps one of the fundamental reasons is the
type of organization that characterizes the Navy. As stated earlier, it is operated on a budget
allocation basis that is not tied to the mission nor to a definitive cost objective. Budget alloca-
tion based institutions respond to a different concept of "performance" or "results." Result in
the budget-based institution means a larger budget. Performance is the ability to maintain or to
increase one's budget. In both cases, neither objective serves the best interest of the customer,
who is attempting to acquire the best product for the least cost. It does not seem logical that a
budget-base mentality would serve the best interest of a cost conscious customer.
Another fundamental reason for the non-existence of a reasonable costing system is
the availability of manpower to accomplish good estimating. Less than half of the cases ap-
proved for Pricing and Availability data are finally accepted for implementation. That is, out of
more than three thousand cases requiring Pricing and Availability data, less than fifteen hundred
have actually become FMS cases for NAVSEA. If the field activities are currently suffering from
manpower shortages as a result of congressional actions, there is little incentive to be accurate
and correct in an estimate for Price and Availability data that may not produce a case. In
addition, once a contract is signed (Letter of Offer and Acceptance), one of the stipulations of
the contract is for the international customer to pay all costs resulting from the subject trans-
action. Hence there is no real incentive to be extremely accurate. The Letter of Offer and
Acceptance becomes essentially a cost plus fixed fee contracting device. A number of the
international customers have complained. In addition, the General Accounting Office has done
studies in this area (GAO Report Sept 1978). The available evidence suggests that there is no
strong incentive on the part of the Systems command or the field activity to respond with ac-
curate costing data.
Another dimension in the treatment of the international customer is the meeting of sche-
dules. Given that the international customer is paying for a product, it should be delivered on
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time. In discussions with NAVSEA and Naval Ordnance Station, Lousiville, it was found that
rarely are products delivered on time. There are many reasons for the delays, but fundamentally,
the management system is reaction rather than initativeoriented. Each government control
system reviewed indicated a "plan of action and milestones" to review programs, whether they
be contracts with industry or follow ups on other segments within the organization. There seems
to be very little effort spent developing anticipatory systems or contingency planning efforts to
manage problems before they occur. FMS management cases, whether computerized or manual,
were managed on an exceptions basis. If a problem arose, usually discovered too late to result in
timely delivery, schedules were adjusted. This was particulary true when dealing with industrial
type effort. Technical difficulties would delay a project, causing the schedule not to be met.
Reactionary management seemed more characteristic than exceptional. Each case in the
FMS world is handled separately from inception to completion; with each set of problems being
"unique" to the setting of the case. The tendency seemed to be to accomplish or complete each
case separately and proceed to the next one without analyzing a large number of cases to at-
tempt a systems approach.
Another dimension to the treatment of the international customer is the provision of a
quality product. To some extent, quality is probably the most subjective parameter in the
determination of the effectiveness of a FMS transaction. Historically, the international customer
has accepted the U.S. government products or services as being "the best" in the world. A good
reason for such acceptance has been the status of U.S. industry coupled with the fact that the
U.S. enjoys superpower status in the world. A principal difficulty with assuring a high standard
of "quality" is the attainment of an agreement between the U.S. government specifications and
the idiosyncratic desires of the "paying" international customer. Technicians in the two coun-
tries must correspond via the entire length of the FMS chain of command, making it difficult to
communicate specific interpretations and settle technical difficulties. Much of the time, the
final product is not the product envisioned by the international customer. Unofficial and
informal negotiations must be conducted in order to resolve the differences. These negotiations
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are often accomplished without official consent. Although differences are normally worked out
to "customer satisfaction," the preconceived standards initially negotiated by the interna-
tional customer are not obtained during negotiations.
The dilemna in FMS management can be reviewed from another perspective, perplexing to
the field activities. There is some difficulty in the proper placement of the FMS program in the
organizational structure where it can be most effective. At the highest levels of government,
particularly as FMS relates to foreign policy, there seems to be no apparent conflicts. However,
when reviewing the NAVSEA organization and down through to field activities, the position in
the organization became more nebulous and illogical.
A concern of most career naval officers, is survival coupled with demonstrated accomplish-
ments in order to be promoted to the highest possible rank during their career. There is, therefore,
a tendency to seek those "battlefields" where "medals" can be won. Outstanding dramatic
achievement off the main battlefield does not enhance ones chances of making grade. The
program of FMS has tacitly been labelled as such an "off battlefield" program. Even though the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, W.P. Clements, Jr. had instituted the precedence-setting breakfast
meetings in 1975 to dramatize the importance of FMS, and Admiral F. H. Michaelis, Chief of
Naval Material to Admiral J. L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, had continued to drama-
tize its significance and importance, the program lacked manpower to execute the FMS mission.
Tantamount to the lack of manpower was a genuine lack of concern and sufficient appreciation
among Defense Department managers for the size and complexities of the FMS program and of
the serious impact the program has on ongoing weapon systems acquisitions programs. Person-
nel in the Defense Department do not recognize FMS as part of the real mission of the Navy.
Observing the type of personnel normally found in the FMS programs, particularly in Washington,
one finds not the "shining stars," but the middle of the road types or those seeking twilight
tours. There is very little competition to obtain a tour in FMS.
In Argyris' discussion of bureaucratic behavior (Argyris, 1967) the issue of dependency
upon superiors particularly for rewards (grade) and survival is addressed. This is a result of the
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superior being the source of resolution of polarizations and conflicts and the superior having to
set or rearrange the priorities of the subordinates. This is done in an effort to reduce risk too
high for the subordinate to accept. In the FMS program superiors, although paying lipservice to
FMS really do not want to address the issue and subordinates are left to develop their own
priorities. Confronted with such a situation, the subordinates, including field activities, quickly
move to disassociate from the Foreign Military Sales program.
In the NAVSEA organization, the division director for FMS reports to the Principal
Deputy Commander for Logistics. The director is a retiring Navy Captain having to work
through several Rear Admirals whose principal jobs and problems are acquisition and support of
all major U.S. Navy surface weapon systems and support implements. These personnel are
accountable for the operations of the sea going surface Navy. Their promotions are contingent
on their success in this primary mission. In some field commands, the FMS division or branch is
located within the supply or logistic operation. The commanding officer of these facilities,
however, have made it clear that their priorities do not include FMS. The management of FMS
receives the signals that although the President is very keen on the program, the boss (facilities
commander) will have no part of it. The General Accounting Office continues to provide studies
for Congress on the resultant mismanagement and the financial waste and ineptitude demon-
strated by the Defense Department regarding FMS. The fundamental reasons are quite clear;
there are no medals to be won on that battlefield.
Permeating the total FMS program, particularly in addressing the prime concern of the
Navy is the feeling that our Navy comes first. Personnel throughout the entire chain of com-
mand continue to voice this concern. Particularly those in the activities who do not have actual
contact with the international customer. In the context of bureaucratic theory, this is the strong
"nationalistic" identification with the organization; the strong, prevalent desire to make the
Navy the best in the face of competition of another navy. Although statutes and directives state
that international customers will be accorded the "best service and products" in terms of
quality, schedule, performance, and cost, the personnel of the system carry the attitude of U.S.
Navy first, and it is that attitude that is reflected in their work. Upon discussion with workers
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and managers the message was the same. The frequently asked question was, "are you doing the
best for the international and can you demonstrate so?" The most frequent response was, "I can
show you for the U.S. Navy; I am not sure regarding the foreign navy.
The management organization at the field activity level in the current era of FMS is operat-
ing in a laissez-faire type environment. This is due in part to the confusing and often conflicting
directives, statutes, and instructions governing the performance of FMS procedures. The field
activities reviewed were not closely monitored except on an exceptional basis, particularly on
politically sensitive cases. The specific codes in the NAVSEA organization were more concerned
with insuring that costs were absorbed by the specific cases as opposed to analyzing a cost to
performance variance. Shortages of manpower at the NAVSEA headquarters precluded close
monitoring of each case. Some cases were valued as little as a few hundred dollars to some over
several million dollars.
The FMS program appears to have grown with time and has never been reviewed from a
system perspective. As experts entered into the field, establishing positions of advocacy, and as
the policies from the President and Congress evolved, the FMS program took on the character-
istics of an entrenched bureaucracy. The Military Assistance and Sales Manual, the Bible of the
FMS program provides the "best conceptual" source of information on the system, but does not
provide objectives or goals upon which to build an organization. It states in chapter B paragraph
C.l and C.2 " . . Department of Defense sales will support the foreign policy interest of the
United States. . .and . . . will be responsive to foreign requests for sales proposals. . ." It is
interesting that organizations required to meet these guidelines are neither a subject of the
chapter nor are they discussed at length anywhere in the manual.
A text book definition of Planning is, ".
.
.reasoning about how an organization will get
where it wants to go. Its essence is to see opportunities and threats in the future and to exploit
or combat them by decisions taken in the present. . ." (Starling, 1977). To fully grasp the
dynamics of this process, it is necessary to understand its components. What is a plan; how does
a plan differ from a "policy" or program? A policy is a statement of goals and of the relative
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importance attached to each goal. It is translated into a plan by specifying the objectives to be
attained. A proposed set of specific actions intended to implement a plan is called a program.
Field activities are provided many polices by higher command and FMS is only one of
many. The relative importance changes as the crisis of the day is realized and transmitted. Very
few if any specific guidelines regarding specific actions are mandated other than the final pro-
duct and funds. The difficulties involve the limited human resources and the conflicts of prior-
ities in a given time period. The Navy continues to advocate the theory of doing more with less.
The existence of the can-do spirit and appearance of "shining star" individuals at the top of
the organization seem to further complicate the matter in the internal workings of the organiza-
tions.
The field activities have attempted to rise to the expectations of the systems managers with
varying degrees of success. The measures of success are not standard; hence, individual command
assessments have been used to determine success or failure. The delivery of the product as the
fulfillment of an obligation has been touted as a measure of success. However, success as to
whether a good job is being done has not been effectively measured. Field activities can tell how
much money they have received, what they have procured, produced, and delivered. There are
systems that report the final cost charged, and whether the customer received the product or
service. However, there is no real measure of how well the activities have performed. The
incidence and intensity of protest can act as a negative indicator, but positive indicators are not
present in the current system. However, the fact that no protests are voiced does not mean that
a good job has been accomplished!
Aside from the question of a good job, the basic question still remains, is it logical to ex-
pect a good job from a budget-based, non-business, organization such as the Navy? The updates
from the General Accounting Office would lead one to believe that it is logical. Yet, in examin-
ing the policies promulgated by President Carter it seems somewhat conflicting. Constraint is
the prime order of the day, yet sales to allies (who may be unfriendly tomorrow) in the forms
of hardware, research and development and logistic support are also order of the day. The type
of policy makes strange bedfellows for the organizations seeking identity to goals and objectives
in order to realize a sense of accomplishment.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This thesis started by posing several questions aimed towards gaining an understanding of
the FMS process. Those questions were:
1. What is the nature and scope of FMS business?
2. What are the criteria for determining effective FMS management?
3. What are the major problems associated with FMS that effects its
management?
4. What are some of the possible alternatives available to improve existing
management?
The preceeding pages attempted to discuss these questions at some length. Some of the informa-
tion was gathered from the literature and some from observations by the author.
The problems confronting the field activities in performing their task in the FMS program
are largely characterized by a budget-based bureaucratic structure that is characterizes the Navy.
There are additional dimensions that complicates the problems, for example, the fact that FMS
does support specific foreign policy and security interests of the U.S. In addition, the U.S.
Navy is not primarily in the business of selling, but is an acquistioner in the mission of war. The
President and the Congress have throughout history utilized FMS to serve their perceptions of
the country's best interest, causing the management within the FMS program to reflect, often
dramatic changes in philosophy. For example, the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Administra-
tions promoted sales; the Carter administration wants constraint, with sales on requests that have
been carefully reviewed. The FMS program is very much reflective of the slow, differentiated
behavior of a bureaucratic organization.
The current policies in the FMS program interposition the U.S. government between in-
dustry and the international customer. The field activities often appear in the perspective of
industry. They are not close to the customer in terms of communications and access. The re-
sponsiveness of the FMS chain of command down through the systems command is often con-
fusing and conflicting, and no clear cut avenue is available for solving problems that occur
during the execution of a case.
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The field activities view FMS as an additional mission with political sensitivities, unlike
their primary mission. They recognize the political volatility of the program yet they are not
always aware of the reasons for what appears to be haphazard management from the systems
commands and the higher chain of command. The result of this perception is a toleration of
FMS vice an energetic drive to pursue the program with a winning enthusiasm.
The field activities find themselves in a dilemna regarding FMS. The amount of FMS busi-
ness is not predictable enough to accomplish long range planning and, therefore, they cannot
respond in the most effective manner. For example, when the revolt errupted in Iran, a poten-
tial multi-billion dollar sales program evaporated. Many governments that are the international
customers are not as stable as perhaps initially perceived, thereby causing uncertainty in the
FMS markets. The field activities committing significant numbers of resources to the FMS
mission, may not be able to support such a venture. However, because the U.S. government is
always seeking to conserve resources, it inteprets large numbers of human resources engaged in
FMS as expendable. The reasoning appears to be that if the effort is not contributing to the U.S.
Navy effort, it is eligible for elimination.
The FMS program lacks clear, concise objectives with measureable parameters to de-
termine its effectiveness and efficiency. Such a broad brush conclusion could be leveled at
any bureaucratic structure. If, for example, objectives were clear and effectiveness could be
measured, the general view of FMS would be more in tune with a commercial approach to
the problems. The political realities of FMS will not allow such a situation to become a reality.
Each country wants to be treated a bit different from the next. Each desires to have products
built to their specifications subject to that idiosyncrasies. Because the international customers
are paying the fare, they expect special treatment which can not always be accommodated by a
standard system. Thus, differentiation emerges a means of contending with the exceptions.
In the overall management efforts at the field activity level, there have been several at-
tempts to organize in a particular manner in an attempt to accommodate the FMS effort. There
have been three major organizational structures. These are the functional, central and contractual.
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Perhaps the most controversial structure was the contractual organization. The Air Force
negotiated a contract with the Northrop Corporation for management functions that govern-
ment personnel normally performed. The Air Force maintained that due to the growth of FMS
and the attendant growth in the administrative burden associated with such sales, strains were
caused throughout its organization. The GAO, however, surmised that such an agreement was
characterized by organizational conflict of interest; Northrop was also a major supplier of
FMS items and would be in an unfair competitive position to obtain other contracts or be in a
position to influence the work to be performed on other contracts. The GAO, therefore, recom-
mended that such sensitive functions be returned to the Air Force personnel (GAO Report,
Oct 1978).
The Air Force effort seemed to be an attempt to reduce the total systems involvement in
FMS. The Navy has continued to integrate the FMS effort within its existing organization. The
difficulty is that the FMS Program does not fit comfortably into the existing organization.
Those field operations that are organized functionally have difficulty focusing in on the pro-
gram within their organization. The political volatility of FMS requires a system that can provide
top management with information rapidly in response to outside influences. However, the vast
fluctuation in workload and the constant shortage of human resources reduces the overall
effectiveness of the system.
Those field activites that are organized centrally seem to enjoy a better reputation as being
responsive and establishing a local advocate posture for FMS. Information can be quickly trans-
mitted to top management when required, as well as a low profile assumed when the prior-
ities are shifted. In addition, an educational mission can be executed during slow periods to in-
crease the general awareness of FMS throughout the command facility.
The centrally managed operation commit resources to an effort that is not productive on
behalf of the U.S. Navy. They are therefore prime targets for any budget cuts that are always
subjects of discussion. There are many times at the field activity level when these personnel are
viewed as non-productive. The production of the actual product or service will be carried out by
those segments of the operation that accomplish such tasks for the U.S. Navy. The principal
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functions of the personnel in the centrally managed operation will largely be planning, monitor-
ing and follow-up on behalf of the systems manager for an international customer. In the
over-all bureaucratic sense, another layer of management has been added to ensure the task is
accomplished at the lower level. Yet in the final analysis, the existence of the field activity exist
to accomplish all tasks assigned and to provide the necessary management reports to the top.
What is the amount and quality of management required to accomplish such a mission within
the field activity?
The commanding officer must organize his command in such a manner as will provide him
with the kind of organization that will make him most effective. The level of effectiveness will
be judged by his superiors as will be the priorities. The difficulty with FMS is the nonexistence
of stability in the priorities. The results have been mixed, as a function of the uncertainty in the
program. FMS because of its sophistication and complexity, is not a program that a com-
manding officer would be wise to attempt to influence from below. It is a program that requires
reactive behavior in order to be aligned with the whims of the current administration.
It should be concluded that the FMS program will always be a stepchild with inherent
defects that are nearly impossible to cure. The military is not in business to conduct commer-
cial ventures, it is in business to conduct war and that mentality prevails. The military would
prefer to share or give away equipment to allies rather than negotiate and involve itself in the
particulars of commercialism. The fact that the State Department has a tendency to formulate
foreign policy dynamically means implementation will also be dynamic within the Defense
Department. This will mean a continuing shift in the way FMS is conducted, and the field
activities will have to rise to the occasion. When administrations undergo change and personal-
ities are replaced, further changes will take place in the FMS program. Short horizons of view
by management at all levels preclude a systems approach to the the FMS program. The volatility
of the program, coupled with the survival syndrome on the part of top management in the
bureaucracy, precludes significant changes from taking place. FMS is here to stay; it will neither
go away nor will it get well!
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There have been many attacks on the FMS program, particularly in concext with the
bureaucratic management structure that oversees its functioning. There is an ever-growing belief
that other forms of management would be more responsive and flexible to the needs of the
programs operated by the U.S. government. In particular, the concept of Management by Ob-
jectives is beginning to become acceptable in Governmental circles and more realistically applied
to programs such as the FMS area. The heart of Management by Objectives is that it chal-
lenges existing management to state, categorically, what is it is going to do, how it expects to
accomplish it and to establish measures that are quantifiable, containing indices of validity and
reliability. Such a concept is viewed as a threat to the very existence of bureaucracy, and the
resistence is fierce regarding change.
The concept of Management by Objectives implies and, indeed, advocates that superior and
subordinate sit down and create the goals and objectives for some designated period. The goals
and objectives are reviewed and negotiated to insure mutual commitment. There are follow-on
sessions to review progress accomplished, and corrective action is taken where required. The
process is dynamic yet clear and concise; all hands participate, allowing a sense of personal
achievement. The concept seems logical at the commanding officer - systems command manager
level. The commanding officer of field activities must be provided a concise view of the objec-
tives. Once these are established, then depending upon management style and philosophy
implemenation of Management by Objectives is possible.
The assumptions inherent in the Management by Objectives concept are very optimistic.
For example, most people possess needs for power, autonomy, competence, and achievement
and they will respond to opportunities to satisfy these needs on the job. In addition, people
want to know how they are performing on the basis of specific criteria, not vague subjective
judgments or suspicion. While these assumptions may not be applicable to all members of the
Naval organization, certainly most commanding officers would fit this category.
Perhaps a subtlety in the Management by Objectives discussion is a suggestion that the
chain of command is too long and overwhelming. Typically the time required from initial
request to the signing of a Letter of Offer and Acceptance ranges from six to nine months.
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The product or service varies also. With the number of personnel involved, the magnitude of
considerations provided seem excessive. The value added or the value of return to the U.S.
government seems marginal at best. It does not require all the players that seem to be involved.
Several assumptions regarding the FMS program were made at the outset of this thesis. It
seems appropriate to discuss these in light of the discussions held in preceeding chapters. Assump-
tion 1 referred to the adequacy of the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the operation of
an efficient, effective organization for FMS borne out of an evolutionary process. There is
today no genuine method of measuring the effectiveness or efficiency of the Defense Security
Assistance Agency. It continues to perform its mission; cases are negotiated, implemented,
and completed and products and services are transferred for consideration. The ability to esti-
mate cost, effectively still eludes the system. There are many attempts being made, but without
a free, open, unrestrained market the concept of cost is lost. There are no standards in the
international marketplace to determine if efficiency exists. Does the U.S. produce goods and
services at a reasonable price? How can comparisons be made? Who sets the standards? The De-
fense Security Assistance Agency continues to expound that they are operating respectably, but
they do have problems. It might be added that the Agency is not evaluated on how well it does,
but on the volume processes does from year to year.
Assumption 2 referred to the clarity and the conciseness of goals and objectives in the FMS
program. The condition simply does not exist and probably cannot exist under the current
philosophy that FMS is a tool of the U.S. foreign policy. As stated in Chapter One, the debate
as to whether or not FMS should exist is not subject of this thesis. Foreign policy is very volatile,
fluid and political! In essence it must be flexible enough to exploit opportunities as they come
to pass, hence, clarity need only be at the level of foreign policy. FMS as a tool may be pur-
posely designed to remain nebulous in order to be available for the shapers of foreign policy.
Assumption 3 referred to the existence of FMS in a public sector environment and the sub-
sequent requirement for a buffer type mechanism to allow the sales to be conducted in a manner
characteristic of the private sector. This assumption is unfounded. The FMS program does not
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operate as does the private sector, although many features of the private sector are present (e.g.,
contracts, price and availability data, delivery schedules). The inherent difference is that the
organizations that implement the FMS programs are not private sector oriented; they are public
sector (budget-based from taxes) bureaucracies. The behavior is significantly different, resulting
in responses that do not typify the private sector. The FMS program has to be responsive to the
President and the Congress as mandated in the Arms Export Control Act of 1979.
Assumption 4 referred to the political winds that influence the government. The FMS pro-
gram will support the foreign policy interests of the United States regardless of its direction,
sales or constraints. As stated in Chapter Two, the sense of the Congress will prevail in the FMS
program. The FMS program will be preserved as a vital tool of the U.S. foreign policy.
Assumption 5 referred to the need for a positive climate of unlimited opportunity for
achievement by the military personnel involved in FMS. Current observations do not seem to
support the position that opportunities for success exist in a career where FMS is the center of
expertise. There seem to be no medals to earn on that battlefield.
The FMS program is big business, in excess of $10 billion. The United States could im-
prove significantly its balance of payments as well as provide a quality product on time at a
"reasonable" cost. Field activities will play a significant role in the business. There are many
problems, most without easy solutions. One major problem that continues to plague the entire
program is the role the U.S. government wants to play in arms exportation for sale. The current
system, and subsequently the cause of many problems experienced by field activities, relates to
the general level of uncertainty permeating the system direction.
If the U.S. decides to sell military equipment, then conceptually the free enterprise
system can take over. This would allow the existence of a separate corporation, much as the
Canadian system. The Canadian Commerical Corporation was established as a government-
owned organization for the purpose of assisting international governments in procuring goods
and services from Canadian sources. It handles the procurement on behalf of the international
customer, soliciting bids from firms (in the U.S. the field activities would be com-
petitive by submitting bids, thereby allowing the cost concept to prevail) and establishing con-
tracts for the desired items (Kaine and Wilhite, 1969).
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The Canadian system has the advantages of releasing the Defense Department resources
from the administrative entanglements and the idea of selling rather than acquiring. It further
places the success or failure of the program as the central objective of the management and
thereby eliminate the problem of conflicting priorities currently present in the U.S. Navy.
The view of the government attempting to control a program with which it has vested
interest is difficult to conceptualize without recognizing that such a situation will always have
problems. If on the one hand, Egypt wants to buy F-5 fighters and wants to support the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization objectives, the U.S. is in a difficult position if the balance of pay-
ments and Northrop Corporation very much want the sale, but the State Department finds
reasons to object in view of commitments to Israel. When conflicting signals flow down from
the top the organization is very uncomfortable in response.
The problems, the character, and the conceptual relationship that describe the FMS pro-
gram from the field activity view are really no different from any superior-subordinate relation-
ship in existence for a product, service, or survival. What we have attempted to accomplish is
an in-depth view of the relationships to identify some of the problems, thus providing some
assistance in relieving some of the current difficulties in the FMS program. In all the discussions
and all the literature and in reflection, very little can be done until some fundamental changes
occur in organizational structure.
The objectives of future studies in this area should be directed not at finding new methods
of management, but rather at new methods of implementation. How does one secure a change
in top management so as to be definitive in the goals and objectives in the FMS program? How
does the Congress become more responsvie to the needs of the international customer in the
legislative process? There has to be some clarity and decisiveness regarding selling and control-
ling of arms exportation, if the program is to achieve any degree of efficiency. What are the
conceptual inadequacies of the current "pricing and availability" policy that cause cost overruns
and missed schedules?
Research questions of the nature discussed above require in-depth research and review.
They further require an openness and willingness on the part of the leadership of the Foreign
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Military Sales program to want to address these issues. There was little evidence in the literature
or during the interviews that suggested that there were efforts underway to address issues raised.
As the cost of defense continues to rise and as greater acceptance is gained for Standardization,
Rationalization, and Interoperability with our allies, the program of Foreign Military Sales will
grow. If the program is to meet future demands imposed upon it, fundamental concepts of
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Primary Interviews occurred in January and May, 1979
Bergman, R. Commander, SC, USN, Supply Officer, Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering
Station NSWSES, Port Hueneme, CA
Betz, G.E. GS-13, Planning and Control, Naval Ordnance Station NOSL, Louisville, KY
Blackburn, D. Special Assistant to the Commanding Officer, NOSL, Louisville, KY
Burnette, D.J. Production Engineering, NOSL, Louisville, KY
Cullin, W. LT Professor Engineering Management Defense Systems Management College, Fort
Belvoir, VA
De Jarnette, H.M. Captain, USN, Commanding Officer, NOSL, Louisville, KY
Drexler, D. C. Country Manager, (FMS) NSWSES, Port Hueneme, CA
Edwards, D.D., USN, Comptroller, NOSL, Louisville, KY
Engel, P.H., Rear Admiral, Director, Plans, Programs and Financial Management/Comptroller
Directorate, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Florio, M. T. Foreign Military Sales Division Head, NSWSES, Port Hueneme, CA
Frye, T.H. Foreign Military Sales Division Head NSWSES, Port Hueneme, CA
Gallardo, T.S. Country Manager, (FMS) NSWSES, Port Hueneme, CA
Gavin, V.M. Commander, USN, Field Assistance Office, NAVILCO, Phildelphia, PA
Griffith, W.B., Security Assistance Division, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Herring, E.L. Captain, Security Assistance Division Director, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Jones, H.L. Project Planning, NOSL, Louisville, KY
Lovell, I.W. GS-15, Logistic Division, NOSL, Louisville, KY
McKenna, C.E. Special Foreign Programs Coordinator, Security Assistance NAVMAT,
Washington, D.C.
Owens, J.F. Commander, SC, USN, Director, Programs Systems Policy, Procedures and Re-
sources Branch; International Logistics Division, Naval Supply Systems Command,
Washington, D.C.




Rodolico, R. Head Security Assistance Branch, Accounting Procedures and Operations Division,
NAVSEA, Washington, D. C.
Romana, A. Deputy Director, Gun Systems Support, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Rowe, B. Security Assistance Division, Military Sales Specialist, OPNAV, Washington, D.C.
Synder, G. General Engineer, Gun Systems Support Division, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Thomas, D. Security Assistance Division, NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.
Wells, P.D., Commander, SC, USN, Supply Officer, NOSL, Louisville, KY.
White, J. Special Program Coordinator, Security Assistance, OPNAV, Washington, D.C.
Witt, J.W., GS-12, Management Analyst, NOSL, Louisville, KY.
Wolper, I. Head Programs Support Section (0421C), NAVSEA, Washington, D.C.




QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED IN A MANAGEMENT STUDY -
(From Wiren and Heyel - PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT RESEARCH)
1. Are all the functions performed really necessary?
2. Can the same results be obtained in some easier or simpler manner?
3. Are functions peformed in the most logical order?
4. Has an effort been made to see whether combining, changing, or splitting up of functions
and assignments would be of advantage?
5. Are functions and responsibilities of all employees clearly defined?
6. Is the incoming work reviewed by a person competent to distribute it, so that it reaches
those who are supposed to handle it? Is it distributed promptly?
7. Are employees properly trained to understand the purpose of their work, as well as the
actual operations they perform? Are they fully aware of the ultimate effects of error?
8. Are individual employees competent to handle their regular work without guidance?
9. Are check sheets used where feasible, to make certain that every necessary point has been
covered?
10. Are standard methods and procedures down in writing?
11. Are there delays in getting necessary approvals?
12. Is checking done promptly? Are there standard methods for checking quality and com-
pleteness? Are there unnecessary duplications in checking?
13. When errors occur, are the reasons for them studied as case material for training or for
change procedure?
14. Is there a record of production by individual workers as well as for the unit? Are there
wide variations in the work of employees doing similar work?
15. Are there definite standards of quality and tolerance? Are these reviewed periodically?
16. If there is considerable fluctuation in the flow of work, is the personnel arrangement flex-
ible enough to permit handling without bottlenecks?
17. Are records and other reference material kept in such a way as to permit looking up in-
formation with a minimum loss of time? Is material taken from files returned promptly?
18. Are inquiries regarding status of the work handled in such a way as to keep interruptions
at a minimum?
19. Are there enough people traned for adquate perofmrance to permit normal functioning
when employees are absent for any reason?
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20. Is there an adequate system of follow-up?
21. When operations or requirements are changed, are they reviewed to see whether improve-
ments are possible?
22. When general instructions are issued, is there a procedure to make certain that all em-
ployees, including those ill or on vacation, are notified?
23. When individual employees have a problem, can they get an answer or advice promptly?
24. Are unusual problems taken out of the flow of regular work for immediate attention of the
supervisor?
25. When an employee is absent, is his pending work reviewed to pic up items which need
immediate action?
26. Does work come into the department in a way which causes unnecessary delay or
handling?
27. Are instructions given in the simplest and clearest way, to avoid misunderstanding? Are
there points of procedure or policy on which there is a difference in interpretation, and on
which clarification is needed?
28. Are employees encouraged to make suggestions? Can employees submit suggestions with-
out disclosing their names until later?
29. Are there any improvements which were supposed to have been made, but on which no
action has been taken?
30. Are there definite deadlines by which some phases of the work are supposed to be com-
pleted? Are there adequate methods to make sure that certain jobs are not permitted to
drift until it is impossible to meet their deadlines?
31. Are errors found by employees themselves reported, or is there a tendency to cover up?
32. Where computations can be made with the aid of a table, are such tables used instead of
having employees make individual computations?
33. Is there a definite procedure for noting changes on forms, so that at the time of reordering,
all of these would come up for considerations?
34. Is all necessary equipment readily available? Should some manual operations obviously
be done by machine?
35. Are requisitions for materials, equipment, or repairs taken care of promptly enough to
avoid holdup of work?
36. Does physical layout keep waste motions to a minimum? Are problems of light, air, space,
and noise kept in mind?
37. Is there a system of giving credit for temporary transfer of personnel from one unit to
another, reflecting decreased personnel costs to the first unit?
38. Is the performance of a unit evaluated, at least partially, from the point of view of total
personnel cost and unit cost?
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39. Is employee knowledge of work tested in some systematic manner, in addition to dis-
cussing errors?
40. Is employee training on a systematic basis, rather than one of "picking up" information
by experience on the job?
41. Are new employees introduced to their work and to fellow employees in a way that
makes them feel at home?
42. Is there a simple, effective procedure which permits employees to air their grievances with
their superiors, rather than merely discuss them with fellow employees?
43. Are there signs of personal friction?
44. When there is a possibility of competitive production performance between separate units
doing similar work, is this used as an encouragement of the best possible effort?
45. Are there wide variations in pay of employees performing similar work?
46 Do compalints, both external and internal, reach the appropriate executive promptly?
47. Are performance and salary discussed with each employee at least once a year, at which
time suggestions for further improvement in performance are made?
48. When transfer of personnel is contemplated, is the true evaluation of an employee revealed
to the unit asking for him, or are unsatisfactory employees given a higher record than they
deserve, simply to get rid of them?
49. When an employee does not do as well as is expected, is the problem faced promptly? Is
he put on probation or even asked to resign, or is the situation allowed to drag on?
50. Is each supervisor encouraged to train someone as his successor, as a prerequisite to his
own advancement to a more responsible position?
51. Are supervisors expected to obey general regulations, or are they allowed to disregard
rules applicable to other employees?
52. When conferences or discussions are called, are those asked to attend informed in advance
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